

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**FROM THE BALKANS TO IRAQ - A STRATEGIC POLICY OUTLINE FOR
INTEGRATED STABILITY OPERATIONS**

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ABSTRACT

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The United States National Defense Strategy states the United States is committed to providing military forces and capabilities to unilateral and coalition stability operations. Our current involvement in stability operations in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan, underscores this commitment. Although the Department of Defense is conducting stability operations however, there is a void in joint doctrine between stability operations strategy development, campaign planning, and campaign execution. This paper will move beyond the guidance, directives, and theoretical of the interagency and joint staff, to provide the practical science of applying pre-conditions or "enablers" necessary to transition from initial entry operations to stability operations. To the military service member and the people of the United States, the fact that we go with or without international partners and the degree of risk involved is not relevant: success is what is expected. With the correct pre-conditions identified and sourced before commitment, future planners will be capable of addressing the unique, non-military characteristics of stability operations.

FROM THE BALKANS TO IRAQ - A STRATEGIC POLICY OUTLINE FOR INTEGRATED STABILITY OPERATIONS

The United States is committed to providing military forces and capabilities to unilateral and coalition stability operations today and in the future.¹ While this appears to be an intuitive statement, and senior government leaders now readily discuss the concept, the United States government has not defined levels of participation for military contributions to non-military functions in stability operations. Today, the United States is conducting post conflict or post entry phase stability operations as a NATO Partner in Kosovo as part of the Kosovo Force (KFOR), in the Sinai with the United States brokered Multi-National Force and Observer Mission (MFO), and in Afghanistan both as coalition lead in Operation Enduring Freedom and as an NATO alliance member with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

Interestingly, future stability operations may not follow combat, but once the entry phase of a military operation is over, and security is established, the enduring nature of stability operations begins. To lessen the adverse impact of an enduring operation on the military is in the United States' national interest, and is an under-appreciated key enabler for the United States Department of Defense's 1-4-2-1 strategy.²

In the final decade of the 20th century, the United States and our NATO allies entered the Balkans (the former Yugoslavia) with the United Nations' (UN) endorsement for multiple reasons. Initial entry by NATO military forces followed endorsement by regional nations and the United Nations to overcome the limitations of the UN missions with the objective of preventing further violence and establish a functioning multi-ethnic nation in Bosnia. After the transition from the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to the NATO International Force (IFOR) to the Stabilization Force (SFOR), the international community recognized a new model for peace enforcement had emerged.³ NATO conducted a military campaign following the withdrawal of UNPROFOR which preceded the IFOR occupation of Bosnia.

Following the restoration of security in Bosnia, Kosovo became the United Nations' and NATO's next focus of peacekeeping effort. Originally designated Operation Allied Force, NATO's entry into Kosovo was preceded by an air campaign that convinced the Serbian government to withdraw forces from the province. KFOR, as the NATO led operation was to become known, continues to exploit the capabilities of UN and European Union institutions for stability operations.

The Balkans have not provided the only opportunity to achieve success in the stability operations sphere. Following successful combat operations in Iraq, the United States and the coalition of the willing, without similar NATO or United Nations support, have attempted to

establish the conditions necessary for the Iraqi people to establish a functioning multi-ethnic, culturally diverse, and inclusive democracy. The assessment of this effort by the international community remains a vitally important issue.

This paper will move beyond the guidance, directives, and theoretical of the Interagency and Joint Staff, to provide the practical science of applying pre-conditions or “enablers” necessary to transition from initial entry operations to stability operations. To the military service member and the people of the United States, the fact we go with or without international partners and the degree of risk involved is not relevant, success is what is expected. With the correct pre-conditions identified and sourced before commitment, future planners will be capable to address the unique, non-military characteristics of stability operations.

Authorization and Direction for Post Conflict and Stability Operations

The challenge for the White House, Department of Defense, and Department of State is to combine the collective capabilities inherent in the executive branch of government to prepare for, implement, and conclude stability operations when required. In August 2004, the Department of State established the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. Now armed with a recent Presidential Directive, the Department is appointed the coordination authority for reconstruction and stabilization within the executive branch and named as the primary coordination link to the international community.⁴ In recognition of the challenges involved in military support for stability operations, the Department of Defense (DOD), established DOD directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations.⁵ Where operations require the capabilities inherent in the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of State (DOS), the Presidential Directive directs coordination, yet the challenge is to develop a coherent strategy and eventually a campaign plan.

But why should we develop a strategy for stability operations when we have the National Security Presidential Directive 44 and DOD directives? Simply stated, without a strategy, we will continue to coordinate our way through a planning process without identifying or sourcing the key enablers or elements necessary to implement *The National Security Strategy of the United States* (NSS).⁶ A strategy is required because the principal means for initiating and fully executing post conflict stability operations, our military element of national power, are the same means to implement requirements of both the *National Security Strategy* and the *National Defense Strategy*. It is essential to recognize that we do not have an implementation strategy or a campaign plan for combining all elements of national power in post conflict operations, only a

pair of directives for coordination. Likewise, post conflict operations warrant only a brief paragraph in the *National Defense Strategy for the United States* (NDS). The Secretary of Defense considers these as lesser contingencies and potentially long in duration. Yet, the NDS does not address the requirement for other elements of national power to complement the capabilities of the military.⁷ DOD Directive 3000.05 only directs the assessment of DOD capabilities and development of policy options.⁸ It is the *National Military Strategy* that authorizes military integration within the interagency process. It states "Commanders must ensure military activities are integrated effectively with the application of other instruments of national and international power to provide focus and unity of effort."⁹ Therein lays the military planner's dilemma: operational and tactical commanders are required to pursue efficiencies of the interagency and capabilities of international forces, but these are not directly provided by the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Staff, or the White House.¹⁰

The *National Military Strategy* embeds peace operations in stability operations, and combines the Joint Operating Concept (JOC) for stability operations with strategic deterrence.¹¹ The introductory comment on stability operations reinforces the commitment by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to integrate other elements of national power. "Winning decisively will require synchronizing and integrating major combat operations, stability operations, and significant post-conflict interagency operations to establish conditions of stability and security favorable to the United States."¹²

So, armed with two implementing directives, the Presidential Directive and DOD Directive 3000.05, and three strategies, the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and National Military Strategy, military planners are saturated with strategic vision, and are challenged to develop options to accomplish objectives as identified by their commander, yet they do not have interagency tasking authority for integrating other elements of national power. Nor does this authority currently reside in the Department of State.

These directives and strategies are complementary in vision, but not sufficient for execution by the means available, the military. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff states, "The *National Military Strategy* supports the aims of the *National Security Strategy* and implements the 2004 *National Defense Strategy*."¹³ However, the National Military Strategy does not provide a strategy for stability operations. Without a national strategy for stability operations, military planners and their interagency counterparts will not be efficient in their ability to "...synchronize military action with the application of other instruments of national power."¹⁴

Strategy alone does not facilitate execution of policy in stability operations, only a campaign plan can achieve this result. Additionally, a campaign plan can measure the

effectiveness of efforts within policy objectives. Therefore, combining a post conflict or stability operations strategy with a campaign plan will also enable the Department of Defense and The White House to quantify and evaluate the effectiveness of operations in achieving desired objectives without quantifying operational success with a military exit strategy.

This combination will enable the commander and other agency's implementing capabilities or elements of national power to recommend a transition from military to a Transitional Authority other than military means. A national strategy for stability operations will identify attainable objectives (ends), provide a road map or course of action for execution (ways), and the campaign plan will successfully integrate all element of national power (means).

Developing Attainable Objectives (Ends)

The key to developing attainable objectives is to identify the conditions or ways integral to achieving those objectives. This would appear a rather intuitive statement, yet in reality it is a difficult undertaking for military planners. Colin S. Grey, a professor of international politics and for over twenty years an advisor to the United States government, identified this challenge when proposing "categories of conditions for success" for special operations forces.¹⁵ His assessment on identifying conditions is that "one can neither specify conditions that guarantee success nor identify the circumstances that guarantee failure."¹⁶ However, to develop a campaign objective without a feasible course of action is insufficient. The NMS states: "Winning decisively will require synchronizing and integrating major combat operations, stability operations, and significant post conflict interagency operations to establish conditions of stability and security favorable to the United States."¹⁷ Therefore it should follow that these post conflict conditions are identifiable or evident to campaign planners. The NMS captures this requirement by stating, "The joint operating concepts (JOCs) for major combat operations and stability operations are complementary and must be fully integrated and synchronized in campaign planning."¹⁸ It may be prudent for the Joint Staff to develop this campaign plan for means other than military.

It is also vitally important to identify pre-conditions for stability operations before transitioning from combat operations. The NMS directs the joint force to "Win decisively. Where necessary, commander's plans will include options to rapidly transition to a campaign to win decisively and achieve enduring results."¹⁹ The CJCS concludes with; "Such campaigns require capabilities for conventional warfighting, unconventional warfare, homeland security, *stability and post conflict operations*, countering terrorism and security cooperation activities."²⁰ With this charge, the CJCS is directing the unlimited use of the military element of national power to win decisively on the battlefield, and in the post conflict stage of operations. But it is the immediate

follow-on task to “rapidly transition” to another campaign that suggests the required capabilities must be available and are either committed simultaneously with combat operations or are follow-on capabilities. For this construct to work, there are two separate challenges for the commander of a joint force in identifying the appropriate capabilities for stability operations as a unilateral coalition force. The challenge: resourcing the capabilities required (ways) and sustaining a commitment of effort, both military and non-military (the means), for as long as the mission requires.

Unilateral and Coalition Operations (The Ways)

Ralph Peters, a retired U.S. Army officer and noted author of numerous national security and Department of Defense policy issues, captured the essence of unilateral campaign planning and military capabilities in stability operations when he stated “Peace is expensive... but when the peace is the peace of others, far from our shores and faint in its relevance, cost matters. Usually the financial price is minor compared to other national expenditures. But the cost to our military establishment, already slimmed to fragility and poorly structured for missions short of war, can be exorbitant.”²¹

Stability operations in a unilateral campaign may appear easiest for unity of effort and command; however, it reduces the commander’s flexibility to transition forces to another campaign. In unilateral operations, the commander will be required to rely heavily on the Interagency to provide capabilities that are necessary to execute stability operations and enable the release of initial combat forces. It will also reduce the military’s challenge of assuming a requirement or capability which is not a core competency within the Department of Defense. It is the least preferred course of action as it does not suggest international commitment to stability operations.

Stability operations within a coalition make the complexity of joint operations appealing, even preferred, during the initial phase of coalition building. Multiply this combined operation complexity by the number of participating coalition nations and you will still note that command structures are undermanned.²² If this were an operation within an alliance, the necessary capabilities may be identified by national commitment or treaty obligation unlike the adhocism common in coalition operations.²³ However, coalitions enhance the commander’s ability to maximize coalition member niche capabilities, both military and non-military, to accomplish stability operation objectives. This is also the preferred course of action to demonstrate international resolve to the population of the defeated enemy.

Pre-Conditions for a Stability Operations Strategy (The Means)

The critical pre-condition for a stability operations strategy is complete and unabridged interagency support to the campaign plan. The commitment must include technical expertise embedded in the stability operation phase of the campaign, as well as physical representation and co-location with military forces. As mentioned earlier, these capabilities can precede combat operations, be executed simultaneously or even sequentially. But there must be joint and interagency integration both in the execution of strategy (the ways) and implementation of the strategy within a campaign plan (the means).

There is no shortage of conceptual advice on how to make stability operations work. Joint doctrine, government agencies and academia are fully engaged, yet the transition from political and organizational theory to execution is the unfulfilled ‘last mile’ for stability operations. One of the best concepts for correcting this challenge is a combined Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Association of the United States Army (AUSA) book, *Winning the Peace, An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction*.²⁴ The concepts outlined are based on four pillars: security, governance and participation, social and economic well being, and justice and reconciliation, and are laid out in a very accomplished post conflict reconstruction task framework, one so comprehensive that the Department of State uses it to coordinate post conflict strategy development.²⁵

For the strategic planner at the combatant command and joint force command, the pillars and task framework are not relevant, however, the true limitation is that although detailed in task identification or endstate, the framework tasks are firmly centered on the conceptual line of thought and not readily transferable to a capability or function. In order to move from the theoretical to the practical, there are five pre-conditions identified for stability operations which must be resourced and trained before implementing within a campaign. Once these pre-conditions are met, they can be considered as lines of operation or lines of effort.²⁶

These pre-conditions are the enablers for the Joint Force Commander’s transition from combat operations to stability operations. These are considered pre-conditions for planners and commanders, and are not considered enabling functions until sourced, trained, deployed, and integrated. This development of pre-conditions before establishing a cognitive and conceptual line of operation will merge strategic political guidance with a credible stability operations strategy and campaign plan.

These fully developed, resourced pre-conditions can be “on the shelf” in a combined DOD and Interagency campaign plan which will prove sufficient to shape policy and strategy with means. In effect, these pre-conditions for post conflict operations will also enable the military to

better integrate the interagency community by reducing the time needed to develop post conflict participation and requirements by capabilities other than the military.

Closing the Gap

There is a void in joint doctrine between stability operations strategy development, campaign planning, and campaign execution. It is rather difficult for commanders and senior DOD leaders to recognize this gap. It may be they are convinced subordinate commanders and planners are capable of rapidly integrating strategic policy with the means, however strategic and operational planners recognize there is only a rapid integration of military capability and not other than military or DOD functions. The purpose of a campaign plan is to provide a concept that will close the strategic doctrine gap.²⁷

The gap is closed as we take the development of strategy through to the logical and physical implementation of a campaign plan. This will enable joint force commanders to apply concepts that have been identified as stability operation lines of operation or lines of effort to be initiated during combat and avoid a time or capability gap during a transition to stability operations immediately following combat.

While these pre-conditions may appear as self evident to some personnel in the Department of Defense, Department of State, academia and governmental contracting community, it is nothing more than a conceptual construct based on observations since Operations Desert Shield/Storm and Restore Hope, the Balkans, and September 11, 2001.²⁸ There is no emergent policy for resourcing stability operations, only a policy for coordinating planning. This does not transition to execution with the pace of a military execution order and deployment. For example, in KFOR, the UN Civil Police deployment required over a year from approval to deployment.²⁹

This gap in doctrine can be mitigated by establishing a strategic policy outline for unilateral and coalition operations. If we review operations from the Balkans to Iraq, we can identify from a military planner's perspective those pre-conditions for stability operations that worked well in the Balkans and were not present in Iraq. With this we establish those pre-conditions for resourcing and the implementation of a stability operation strategy. There are five pre-conditions required by the Department of Defense before implementing today's national strategy in stability operations. These five pre-conditions are:

- Diplomatic support for stability operations
- Security for the population and occupation forces
- Public service infrastructure repair, to include health and education facilities

- Governance for self determination of civil populations
- Economic revitalization initiatives to support a sustainable local, regional or national economy.

The challenge for strategic planning for stability operations is that none of these pre-conditions are either a military function or capability. Without access to these capabilities or functions, however the joint force commander will be compelled to implement and execute stability operations in a manner not unlike a Roman proconsul vice a joint force commander, utilizing military force alone.

Diplomatic Support

Diplomatic support is the first among five otherwise equal components of an integrated stability operations strategy. It is the international enabler of legitimacy for the combatant among the defeated, and ensures there is recognition by the defeated of international resilience in stability operations. Diplomatic support is inherent in coalition operations. Each coalition member nation provides exponential legitimacy to the stability operation effort. The ability of the coalition to leverage the non military capabilities of coalition members in stability operations is another force multiplier for the joint force commander. If the affected population recognizes both international organizations and coalition national efforts are mutually dedicated to restore international norms to a post conflict situation, the transitions between military and other than military means will engender popular support within the defeated or occupied population.

This diplomatic effort can not be separated or compartmented within the domain of ministers and secretaries. It must be integrated as a line of operation with an applicable metric for the evaluation of effort or measure of effectiveness by the joint force and combatant commanders. The coalition ministers and secretaries must also measure their level of effort against these measures of effectiveness. For post conflict and stability operations, the measure of effectiveness necessary before committing forces to combat is to prepare the diplomatic effort for stability operations before hostilities.

However, this degree of diplomatic support is unattainable in unilateral operations. The defeated may view their situation as that of an occupied country or nation and that the occupier is without international legitimacy. For the post conflict political environment, it is likely that transference of popular dissatisfaction with a former regime will be realized by the joint force commander and his command. For the population, there is often no easily recognizable difference between a combat phase soldier and a stability phase soldier.

Stability operations, and especially the stability operations phase, may appeal to international, transnational, or non-governmental organizations that may not support the combat phase of a campaign.³⁰ The joint force commander can not ordinarily access these organizations or capabilities, though. The Department of State has facilitated this function by establishing the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S C/R&S). However this is a DOS capability for planning and coordinating interagency capabilities in stability operations, not a directive body.³¹

As presently organized, the DOS C/R&S is an organization which is prepared to execute deliberate planning. It is not capable of executing this function in crisis action planning. As a pre-condition, diplomatic support must work in two directions, one within the international community for the support of the United Nations and recruitment of coalition capabilities both military and non-military. Upon recruiting or securing coalition participation, DOS must facilitate the resourcing and integration of these capabilities throughout the duration of the campaign.

Second, DOS must be prepared for integrating the interagency capabilities necessary for stability operations. This dual track requirement will not work within the timeline for crisis action planning. These requirements must be integrated into an existing campaign plan. For our purpose as a pre-condition, DOS must establish an interagency system similar to DOD Global Force Management Guidance for identifying and allocating interagency capabilities for stability operations campaign planning and execution. The specific capabilities required for a DOS Global Interagency Capability Management Guidance for stability operations is the next logical step for the C/R&S, however current OPM guidance does not enable the deployment of these government employees. While some believe the interagency can be deployed as easily as the military, in reality the deployment of federal personnel is at best a voluntary effort within the participating functions of the interagency.

As if the challenge is not great enough in the campaign plan, diplomatic support for an operational transition point is a must. This is where the stability operation phase clearly evolves from military primacy to that of a DOS country team construct with the military in a traditional supporting role. This is vital since the joint force commander and his command can only assume these functions for a short duration.

Security for the Host Nation Population and Implementing Forces and Civilian Staff

The security pre-condition is an estimate of the additional security forces required for stability, the source for those security forces, and the command relationship between the joint force commander and the civil security forces and civil authority. Once identified, sourced and

deployed, the security pre-condition is met and becomes a line of operation within the stability operations campaign. The security element of the stability operations strategy is inclusive of both the civil population and the implementing forces and civilian staff. This is the military's core competency in stability operations, yet experience suggests the military is not the only element capable of providing the function.

For example, the US Department of State possesses a little noted civilian police recruitment and training staff that supports United Nations police enforcement elements. In Kosovo, the United Nations Civil Police are responsible for providing basic police services and training of the Kosovar indigenous police force.³² These forces assumed many of the security functions initially provided by the military element of KFOR, and will eventually transition police functions to the Kosovar indigenous police. Note that this capability is found within the security pre-condition, yet is based on diplomatic support for the campaign. An unheralded element of the Kosovo mission, the UN Civil Police contribution combined with diplomatic efforts to defuse regional tension enabled NATO to materially reduce the number of peacekeepers in the province.

Essential pre-conditions determined for a security line of operation are:

- The military must be tasked for defense of the occupied country or regional borders
- An appropriate internal security force must be sourced and available at local, provincial and national levels.

If policy goals include the retention of indigenous security forces, then the pre-condition must also include:

- The security infrastructure must not be compromised. If the antebellum security forces do not have the popular support coalition policy support to execute the security function during stability operations, another non-military means must be readily available to fill the void.

To transition from the theoretical to the practical in the security pre-condition it is relevant to compare the number of security forces to the population secured. For example New York City has a population of over eight million citizens. The city's police department has approximately thirty nine thousand patrol and detective personnel, which results in a security ratio in New York of one police officer for every two hundred 200 citizens. By comparison with stability operations in Kosovo, four thousand five hundred UN Civil Police are present for duty securing a civilian population estimated at between one million five hundred thousand to one million seven hundred thousand citizens. This establishes a security ratio of one police officer for every three hundred and thirty citizens. This civil support for the security mission in Kosovo allowed KFOR

to not involve soldiers in law enforcement or training and accrediting police forces. For the citizens of Kosovo it also demonstrates a transition to normalcy.

However, in OIF 1 in Iraq, Baghdad had a population of six million people and initially only military forces available to provide security.³³ The military became the lead trainer for the new Iraqi police force as well. This issue alone has kept coalition military forces deployed in Iraq at numbers beyond expectations for three years.

Public Service Infrastructure Repair to Include Health and Education Facilities

The joint force commander will not easily transition from the combat phase to stability operations without a return to pre-hostility public service norms, or improvement in basic services. This quality of life imperative enables domestic security, economic vitality, and the opportunity for civil governance to re-establish or sustain governance without having to resort to the pursuit of the basic functions for survival. Attaining this objective will require the commitment of other than military capabilities. Although this function has been assumed by the Department of Defense in Iraq, the military's capability is to capitalize on contracting for long term and emergency repair of existing public service infrastructure. Coalition military efforts can be applied to small targeted segments of the country, but are not sustainable for a long term or capable of replicating national services. Current joint operation concepts suggest only basic system recovery is necessary to facilitate a transition to a "better off" state and eventually redeploy. This is not a validated concept and should not be considered viable.³⁴

Pre-conditions begin with a political policy that enables the joint force commander and an interim civil authority to facilitate introduction of capability. The joint force commander must have a rapid fielding initiative of public works restoration capability to restore infrastructure and services. The military can provide limited duration capability in targeted areas but does not possess the requisite resources for a national effort.

There are three areas which must be addressed in the campaign plan and this line of operation:

- Public utility infrastructure
- Public health
- Public education

Restoration of public utility infrastructure is a national priority but a local activity. In effect, power generation and transmission lines are a national enabling capability for local water and sewer maintenance. Power generation is also the primary enabling function for public health and education services.

Sustainable public service capability must include medical and education facilities for the non combatant population. This is another capability where the military can provide limited emergency support; it is not a sustainable function. Non-governmental organizations (NGO) and international organization (IO) capabilities are required to establish a sustainable public service sector during stability operations.

The pre-conditions for indigenous systems recovery are identification of requisite expertise for assessment teams, and restoration of public infrastructure personnel to duties which may otherwise have been suspended during hostilities. The first challenge is the retention of civil expertise, with oversight if necessary. Basic needs of this key and essential population must include retention of key and essential personnel through pay restoration. Without this manned capability, an intractable crisis will confront the joint force commander.

Governance and Self Determination of Civil Populations

Governance and all of its associated functions will consume military and interagency planners. The scale of the effort, even at a provincial level, is a bridge too far for single entities like military commands. This is a critical, even vital, function that should never be attempted without complete interagency and international support. The United Nations civil administrators in Kosovo have demonstrated their value as a critical enabling function in stability operations. This function, if adequately resourced, can bridge the gap created between local, regional, and emergent or recovering national governing bodies after the dissolution of oppressive governments.

A stability operations strategy must identify desired political structures, source interim solutions and ensure civil recognition of legitimacy of governance institutions. This is best enabled with a multi-disciplined approach of UN, NGO, and coalition nation support. A United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) endorsing the establishment of an interim government is sufficient to initiate this component of the strategy, and UN endorsement also helps underpin the legitimacy of a governance plan.

Economic Revitalization and a Sustainable Local, Regional or National Economy

The final component of a national stability operations strategy is economic revitalization. This is a multi-functional requirement calling for activity by the interagency community, encompassing elements of multiple departments such as State, Commerce, and Treasury. It is an empowered component when complemented by international and transnational bodies such as the World Bank, European Union, and coalition or alliance partners. International legitimacy in economic revitalization efforts accelerates the transition to an indigenous or national

economic entity. The challenge is to ensure this is established as an early effort requirement. The emerging concept of the S/CRS does not emphasize economic revitalization as an enduring effort. Current planning constructs suggest the successful window for stability operations to be approximately two to three years following conflict. During this period, S/CRS efforts are to be focused on establishing governance, and that effort alone will not be enough to support the establishment of a viable economy.³⁵

Integrated Capabilities: Implementation of Means in Stability Operations Strategy/Campaign

There are two challenges for the Department of Defense. First, we must move from the interagency cognitive to the practical in developing strategy. Policy and subsequent strategy development does not require an application of practical science. Instead, assumptions fill in for the practical application of capability or means in strategy formulation. Absent a practical application of means to a campaign plan for stability operations before the actual conduct of military operations is to revisit past errors.³⁶

Second, campaign control, to include the time through transition periods must be pre-designated and agreed upon. Policy is not strategy and a strategy or National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) is not a campaign plan. The campaign must identify either an interim civil government or to other than national actors such as a United Nations Administrator or United States Embassy team. This is a definitive pre-condition for stability operations that must be in place and enabled by legitimate authority before entering the stability operations phase of a campaign. The recommendation for military and interagency planners is to use a conditions-based approach. The established pre-condition becomes a line of operation vice a condition to facilitate measurement of effort and measure of effectiveness within the campaign plan. Eventually there is a release of military control once the security condition is stabilized to the satisfaction of both the commander and transitional authority. The S/CRS must support the effort to transition from a planning body to a planning and supporting function for the civil authority.

The second pre-condition is the sustainment of key enablers for each of the five pre-conditions for the campaign plan. Once the transitional authority has operational or administrative control, the Departments of State and Defense can report a successful transition of phases within a campaign, and can take commensurate steps to lessen overall levels of US effort in theater.

Coordinating Mechanism for Maintaining Interagency Cooperation

The final recommendation for a National Stability Operation Campaign plan is specifying the lead for military and interagency planning and execution. It is easily apparent that the Department of Defense is best prepared to coordinate and conduct the implementation of the campaign planning through the combat phase of a campaign. This ensures unity of effort and command during pre-combat operations and during combat operations.

The Department of State office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) was “established to lead, coordinate, and institutionalize USG civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy, and a market economy.”³⁷ The challenge is to take this capacity to the next level and establish a supporting and supported role within the interagency community. As currently established, the DOS does not propose to direct interagency activities within C/R&S but to monitor the agency’s execution of the function in reconstruction.³⁸ The transitional authority however, must be the Department of State and the Embassy team. The embassy staff can be easily augmented to adequately monitor sustainment of the strategy. Military and other interagency capabilities can be in a supporting role through a return to civil authority. However, the proponent for a national stability operations campaign plan may best be the National Security Advisor, and not the Secretaries or Departments of Defense or State. This is the only executive branch function which has tasking authority across the executive branch, and can insure some measure of credibility within the civilian component of federal government.

Conclusion

Why should the Department of Defense pursue the establishment of an integrated stability operations campaign? It will enable the Department of Defense and the interagency community to develop national global capability management guidance, develops JSCP-like capabilities required, and enables a plan to be based on realistic expectations of capabilities. Just as the NMS supports the NSS and NDS, a national stability operations strategy enables the Department of Defense and Department of State to incorporate integrated capabilities from across the interagency community, coalition members, and international bodies. It empowers the commander to fully integrate joint forces, interagency capabilities, and coalition capabilities throughout the life cycle of a campaign. This pre-conflict, conflict, and post-conflict phasing must have attainable and quantifiable objectives or metrics for determining progress. An integrated stability operations campaign plan will facilitate this campaign life cycle management, enable

military to non-military transitions, and ensure unity of effort and integration of all elements of national and international power throughout.

Endnotes

¹ Donald H. Rumsfeld, *National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington D.C.: The PENTAGON, March 2005), 17.

² Ibid., 17.

³ Frederick H. Fleitz, Jr, *Peacekeeping Fiascos of the 1990's, Causes, Solutions, and U.S. Interests* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 2002), p142-143. UNPROFOR failure and NATO's air campaign preceding the NATO led operations in Bosnia demonstrated the requirement for a more robust mandate to terminate hostilities and establish a peace.

⁴ George W. Bush, *National Security Presidential Directive 44* (Washington D.C.: The White House, 7 December 2005)

⁵ Gordon R. England, Acting Deputy Secretary for Defense, *DOD Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR)* (Washington D.C.: The PENTAGON, 28 NOV 2005)

⁶ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy for the United States* (Washington D.C.: The White House, September 2002)

⁷ The National Defense Strategy as written did not suggest integration of the capabilities inherent in the interagency community.

⁸ DOD Directive 3000.05, 4.

⁹ General Richard B. Myers, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2004, A Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow* (Washington D.C.: The PENTAGON), 7.

¹⁰ DOD Directive 3000.05. 9. Combatant commanders are directed to engage the interagency community, but coordinate with CJCS and SECDEF. No effort from CJCS is directed other than coordination.

¹¹ The National Military Strategy, 12.

¹² Ibid., 3.

¹³ Ibid., 1. The dates of the NMS and NDS are confusing. The NDS of 2004 referred to in the NMS is the working version of the NDS of 2005 before the NDS was officially released by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

¹⁴ Ibid, 13.

¹⁵ Colin S Gray, "Handfuls of Heroes on Desperate Ventures: When do Special Operations Succeed?" *Parameters*, (1999): 3.

¹⁶ Ibid., 2.

¹⁷ National Military Strategy, 13.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ralph Peters, "Heavy Peace" *Parameters* (Spring 1999): 71.

²² Since 2003 the USCENTCOM has challenged the Joint Staff and Service components with joint manning documents for the post conflict headquarters in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Since 1997, USEUCOM has done the same for operations in the Balkans. Additionally, the MFO in Sinai, Egypt, creates a similar semi-permanent manning requirement for that mission.

²³ During a tour as the Chief of Plans for V Corps in CJTF-7, July 2003 to February 2004, coalition operations proved challenging. Member nation red cards, capabilities, rules of engagement, and readiness challenged planners and commanders.

²⁴ Robert C. Orr. Ed., *Winning the Peace, An American strategy for Post Conflict Reconstruction* (Washington DC.: Joint CSIS/AUSA Project on Post Conflict Reconstruction, The CSIS Press, 2004), 10-12. The authors in the study follow an outline of four "pillars" security, governance and participation, social and economic well being, and justice and reconciliation.

²⁵ *The Department of State(DOS) Home Page*, available from the DOS Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction (S C/RS) webpage available from <http://www.state.gov/s/crs/>; Internet; accessed December 2005 through February 2006.

²⁶ These pre-conditions are based on author experience with CJTF-7 as the V Corps Chief of Plans July 2003 through February 2004 at Camp Victory, Baghdad, Iraq. These capture the challenges of nesting CJTF-7, USCENTCOM, and the Coalition Provisional Authority's campaign plans for OIF. It also captures the challenge of Joint doctrine with the development of lines of operation.

²⁷ Robert C. Orr. Ed., *Winning the Peace, An American strategy for Post Conflict Reconstruction* (Washington DC.: The CSIS Press, 2004), 14-16. Published in 2004, the author notes capacity gaps in American post conflict reconstruction. Interestingly, the joint staff recognizes capability gaps when sourcing OIF and OEF rotations. Initial OIF 1 to OIF 2 capability gaps were initially identified as "under lap" between rotating forces by CJTF-7 planners in October 2001. The Joint Staff directed a change in terms and to use "gaps' vice "under lap". The joint staff gap concept continues to be used in planning and sourcing capabilities/units to OIF and OEF.

²⁸ Since the summer of 2003, observers of post conflict operations have published numerous articles, journals and books on post conflict challenges. Currently doctrine, academia, and policy is too broad, and too conceptual, to identify pre-conditions necessary before

implementing a campaign plan. This is not to state these are not outstanding articles, it but they do not capture the specificity of what is necessary for implementing post conflict requirements.

²⁹ Kimberly C. Field and Robert M. Perito, "Creating a Force for Peace Operations: Ensuring Stability with Justice" *Parameters* (Winter 2002-2003): 80. Additional information is captured in the *The United Nations Mission in Kosovo webpage*, available at <http://www.unmikoline.org>; Internet; accessed November 2005 through February 2006. Additional research from the United Nations Mission in Kosovo, noted UNMIK or UN Civilian Police, deployments in the Balkans have over 4500 UNCIVPOL police on duty from 2001 thru 2005.

³⁰ Personal experience with this phenomenon was captured by the author in Kosovo during KFOR rotation 4A. It became a topic of discussion among UN and NGO personnel over a discussion about Operation Enduring Freedom. While these particular individuals from the UN and NGO's did not support forced entry into Afghanistan, they did see a requirement for their organization's niche capabilities. They also were in pursuit of a bonus to their paychecks for working in hazardous duty locations. This was appealing financially since the Kosovo mission was being reconsidered as a safe area by the UN.

³¹ *The Department of State(DOS) Home Page*, available from the DOS Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction (S C/RS) webpage available from <http://www.state.gov/s/crs/>; Internet; accessed December 2005 through February 2006. The key word is found in the office title, "coordinator" not director.

³² *The United Nations Mission in Kosovo webpage*, available at <http://www.unmikoline.org>; Internet; accessed November 2005 through February 2006. Additional research from the United Nations Mission in Kosovo, noted UNMIK or UN Civilian Police, deployments in the Balkans have over 4500 UNCIVPOL police on duty from 2001 thru 2005. Additional information is available on the KFOR and UNMIK Police Web page for UNMIK Police Mandate and tasks.

³³ *The New York City Police Department webpage*, available from the New York City Home page at <http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/>; Internet, accessed December 2005-January 2006.

³⁴ Department of Defense and Joint Forces Command, *Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept Version 1.07* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Forces Command, 9 September 2004), 8. Quantifying a return of basic services to a subjective definition of "Better Off" is difficult to share with defeated populations. The civilian population must see an immediate improvement in basic services or will turn their animosity toward a post conflict force and not their previous government.

³⁵ Department of Defense and State, *United States Joint Forces Command J7 Pamphlet Version 1.0, US Government Draft Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Forces Command and Department of State, 1 December 2005), 21-22. The S/CRS This pamphlet presents a US Government draft interagency planning process for reconstruction/stabilization and conflict transformation operations. The construct is a concern since it is focused on a short term or "nascent" local governance capability development.

³⁶ CJTF-7 OIF 1 campaign development began in earnest after USCENTCOM and CFLCC withdrew headquarters from Baghdad.

³⁷ Department of Defense and State, *United States Joint Forces Command J7 Pamphlet Version 1.0, US Government Draft Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation*(Washington, D.C.: Joint Forces Command and Department of State, 1 December 2005), 7.

³⁸ Ibid, 30.